Daily Papers

While skill optimization for autonomous agents has gained traction, existing methods rely on complex pipelines. This leaves a fundamental question unaddressed: What constitutes a minimal viable pipeline for skill optimization, where every component is justified by theory or empirical necessity? We formalize skill optimization via Zeroth-Order (ZO) optimization, mapping classical counterparts (central difference, trust regions) to recent literature. Noting that unlike blind numerical perturbations in classical ZO, skill trajectories serve as interpretable debugging feedback. Grounded in Claude Code philosophy and PAC learning, we establish three principles for convergence and generalization: file-system-based trajectory exploration, consensus attribute mining, and independent validation gating. Eliminating redundancies, we propose SkillOpt-Lite. It accelerates convergence and outperforms full SkillOpt: improving LiveMath by +8.8 points on GPT-5.5 and +25.4 points on GPT-5.4-nano, allowing the nano model to surpass standard GPT-5.4 optimized by SkillOpt. Finally, we integrate our framework into production coding agents like VSCode Copilot, enabling developers to evolve agent skills via one line of vibe. Because our framework treats all agent components simply as standard editable code, this minimal pipeline naturally generalizes to full harness optimization (HarnessOpt). On SpreadsheetBench, HarnessOpt enables GPT-5.4-nano to achieve 0.7758 accuracy, outperforming the larger GPT-5.5 running standard pipelines (0.7620). Code is available at https://github.com/EvolvingLMMs-Lab/SkillOpt-Lite.

Retrieval-augmented generation stores all content indiscriminately, degrading accuracy as noise accumulates. Parametric approaches compress knowledge into weights, precluding selective updates. Neither mirrors biological memory, which gates encoding based on salience and archives rather than deletes superseded information. We introduce write-time gating that filters incoming knowledge objects using composite salience scores (source reputation, novelty, reliability) while maintaining version chains that preserve prior states. Using real LLM evaluation without oracle access to quality labels, write gating achieves 100 percent accuracy versus 13 percent for ungated stores. The critical finding emerges under distractor scaling: at 8:1 distractor ratios, read-time filtering (Self-RAG) collapses to 0 percent while write gating maintains 100 percent, revealing a structural advantage of write-time over read-time curation. Validation on Wikipedia (20 entities), procedurally generated pharmacology data, and 2026 arXiv papers confirms these findings. The gating advantage scales inversely with parametric memory support: +25pp for Wikipedia, +48pp for post-cutoff arXiv, +65pp for procedural data with zero training knowledge. Signal ablation confirms the method does not depend on oracle-correlated metadata. Write gating matches Self-RAG accuracy at one-ninth the query-time cost.

With the growing prominence of the Mixture of Experts (MoE) architecture in developing large-scale foundation models, we investigate the Hierarchical Mixture of Experts (HMoE), a specialized variant of MoE that excels in handling complex inputs and improving performance on targeted tasks. Our analysis highlights the advantages of using the Laplace gating function over the traditional Softmax gating within the HMoE frameworks. We theoretically demonstrate that applying the Laplace gating function at both levels of the HMoE model helps eliminate undesirable parameter interactions caused by the Softmax gating and, therefore, accelerates the expert convergence as well as enhances the expert specialization. Empirical validation across diverse scenarios supports these theoretical claims. This includes large-scale multimodal tasks, image classification, and latent domain discovery and prediction tasks, where our modified HMoE models show great performance improvements compared to the conventional HMoE models.

Conditional computation is a popular strategy to make Transformers more efficient. Existing methods often target individual modules (e.g., mixture-of-experts layers) or skip layers independently of one another. However, interpretability research has demonstrated that the middle layers of Transformers exhibit greater redundancy, and that early layers aggregate information into token positions. Guided by these insights, we propose a novel architecture that dynamically skips a variable number of layers from the middle outward. In particular, a learned gating mechanism determines whether to bypass a symmetric span of central blocks based on the input, and a gated attention mechanism prevents subsequent tokens from attending to skipped token positions. Residual norms are controlled with a 'sandwich' or 'perilayernorm' scheme and gate sparsity with an adaptive regularization loss. We had aimed to reduce compute requirements for 'simpler' tokens and potentially foster an emergent multi-level representational hierarchy but, at the scales investigated, our approach does not achieve improvements in the trade-off between validation cross-entropy and estimated FLOPs compared to dense baselines with fewer layers. We release our code at https://github.com/tim-lawson/skip-middle.

We study continual skill acquisition in open-ended embodied environments where an agent must construct, refine, and reuse an expanding library of executable skills. We introduce the Programmatic Skill Network (PSN), a framework in which skills are executable symbolic programs forming a compositional network that evolves through experience. PSN defines three core mechanisms instantiated via large language models: (1)REFLECT for structured fault localization over skill compositions, (2) progressive optimization with maturity-aware update gating that stabilizes reliable skills while maintaining plasticity for uncertain ones, and (3) canonical structural refactoring under rollback validation that maintains network compactness. We further show that PSN's learning dynamics exhibit structural parallels to neural network training. Experiments on MineDojo and Crafter demonstrate robust skill reuse, rapid adaptation, and strong generalization across open-ended task distributions.\footnote{We plan to open-source the code.

We study inference-time pattern-memory gating in a production-scale clinical natural language processing (NLP) pipeline. The pipeline pairs a generator (Llama-3.3 70B) proposing extractions with a verifier (MMed-Llama-3.1 70B) accepting or rejecting them, over 167,034 PMC-Patients narratives, and adds a lightweight memory that learns at deployment which extractions to filter, so the verifier need not re-examine candidates already seen to fail. We report four findings. First, learning filtering rules directly from the verifier's rejections failed at full scale: the relation-extraction filter stayed empty despite 785,797 logged rejections, because they were spread too thinly across too many distinct forms to accumulate. Second, a simpler rule using a fixed clinical ontology produced the same filtering without the verifier, capturing 49,734 ontology-violating relations on a held-out 5,000-patient set. Third, of five versions of the question-answering filter, four failed for distinct, instructive reasons; the fifth succeeded by checking whether a patient's extracted entities support the question asked, and where it applies was 1.84 times likelier to flag an answer the verifier would reject than one it would accept. Fourth, one pattern held across all five: a filter is selective only when it tests the same evidence the verifier weighs, not when it imitates the verifier's output. Together these give a transferable result for any generator-verifier pipeline: the most natural memory design can fail silently at scale, and whether a pre-generation gate is selective is decided before any engineering effort, by whether its signal probes the question the verifier itself answers. Throughout, the system flags suspect extractions rather than deleting them, so every decision stays visible for clinical review. All code and test artefacts are released openly.

Single-source domain generalization attempts to learn a model on a source domain and deploy it to unseen target domains. Limiting access only to source domain data imposes two key challenges - how to train a model that can generalize and how to verify that it does. The standard practice of validation on the training distribution does not accurately reflect the model's generalization ability, while validation on the test distribution is a malpractice to avoid. In this work, we construct an independent validation set by transforming source domain images with a comprehensive list of augmentations, covering a broad spectrum of potential distribution shifts in target domains. We demonstrate a high correlation between validation and test performance for multiple methods and across various datasets. The proposed validation achieves a relative accuracy improvement over the standard validation equal to 15.4% or 1.6% when used for method selection or learning rate tuning, respectively. Furthermore, we introduce a novel family of methods that increase the shape bias through enhanced edge maps. To benefit from the augmentations during training and preserve the independence of the validation set, a k-fold validation process is designed to separate the augmentation types used in training and validation. The method that achieves the best performance on the augmented validation is selected from the proposed family. It achieves state-of-the-art performance on various standard benchmarks. Code at: https://github.com/NikosEfth/crafting-shifts

Large pretrained models, coupled with fine-tuning, are slowly becoming established as the dominant architecture in machine learning. Even though these models offer impressive performance, their practical application is often limited by the prohibitive amount of resources required for every inference. Early-exiting dynamic neural networks (EDNN) circumvent this issue by allowing a model to make some of its predictions from intermediate layers (i.e., early-exit). Training an EDNN architecture is challenging as it consists of two intertwined components: the gating mechanism (GM) that controls early-exiting decisions and the intermediate inference modules (IMs) that perform inference from intermediate representations. As a result, most existing approaches rely on thresholding confidence metrics for the gating mechanism and strive to improve the underlying backbone network and the inference modules. Although successful, this approach has two fundamental shortcomings: 1) the GMs and the IMs are decoupled during training, leading to a train-test mismatch; and 2) the thresholding gating mechanism introduces a positive bias into the predictive probabilities, making it difficult to readily extract uncertainty information. We propose a novel architecture that connects these two modules. This leads to significant performance improvements on classification datasets and enables better uncertainty characterization capabilities.

Knowledge graphs (KGs) are increasingly used to support large lan guage model (LLM) reasoning, but standard triplet-based KGs treat each relation as globally valid. In many settings, whether a relation should count as evidence depends on the context. We therefore formulate triplet validity as a triplet-specific function of context and refer to this formulation as a Quantum Knowledge Graph (QKG). We instantiate QKG in medicine using a diabetes-centered PrimeKG subgraph, whose 68,651 context-sensitive relations are further annotated with patient-group-specific constraints. We evaluate it in a reasoner--validator pipeline for medical question answering on a KG-grounded subset of MedReason containing 2,788 questions. With Haiku-4.5 as both the Reasoner and the Validator, KG-backed validation significantly improves over a no-validator baseline (+0.61 pp), and QKG with context matching yields the largest gain, outperforming both KG validation without context matching (+0.79 pp) and the no-validator baseline (+1.40 pp; paired McNemar, all p<0.05). Under a stronger validator (Qwen-3.6-Plus), the raw QKG gain over the no-validator baseline grows from +1.40 pp to +5.96 pp; the context-matching gap is non-significant (p=0.73) on the raw set but becomes borderline significant (p=0.05) after adjustment for knowledge leakage and suspicious questions, consistent with a benchmark-gold ceiling rather than a QKG limitation. Taken together, the results support the view that the value of a KG in LLM-based clinical reasoning lies not merely in storing medically related facts, but in representing whether those facts are applicable to the specific patient context. For reproducibility and further research, we release the curated QKG datasets and source code.https://github.com/HKAI-Sci/QKG

We introduce GateSkip, a simple residual-stream gating mechanism that enables token-wise layer skipping in decoder-only LMs. Each Attention/MLP branch is equipped with a sigmoid-linear gate that condenses the branch's output before it re-enters the residual stream. During inference we rank tokens by the gate values and skip low-importance ones using a per-layer budget. While early-exit or router-based Mixture-of-Depths models are known to be unstable and need extensive retraining, our smooth, differentiable gates fine-tune stably on top of pretrained models. On long-form reasoning, we save up to 15\% compute while retaining over 90\% of baseline accuracy. On instruction-tuned models we see accuracy gains at full compute and match baseline quality near 50\% savings. The learned gates give insight into transformer information flow (e.g., BOS tokens act as anchors), and the method combines easily with quantization, pruning, and self-speculative decoding.

Large language models apply uniform computation to all inputs, regardless of difficulty. We propose PonderTTT, a gating strategy using the TTT layer's self-supervised reconstruction loss to selectively trigger Test-Time Training (TTT) updates. The gating decision itself is training-free--requiring no learned classifier or auxiliary networks; only a single scalar threshold is initially calibrated on unlabeled data and continuously adapted via EMA to maintain target update rates. Our experiments with GPT-2 models (124M to 1.5B) on code language modeling (The Stack v2, teacher-forced perplexity) demonstrate that this signal is inference-compatible, requiring no ground-truth labels. Our Reconstruction Gating achieves 82-89% Oracle Recovery while being fully training-free, significantly outperforming Random Skip baselines (up to 16% lower loss on OOD languages).

Gating mechanisms have been widely utilized, from early models like LSTMs and Highway Networks to recent state space models, linear attention, and also softmax attention. Yet, existing literature rarely examines the specific effects of gating. In this work, we conduct comprehensive experiments to systematically investigate gating-augmented softmax attention variants. Specifically, we perform a comprehensive comparison over 30 variants of 15B Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models and 1.7B dense models trained on a 3.5 trillion token dataset. Our central finding is that a simple modification-applying a head-specific sigmoid gate after the Scaled Dot-Product Attention (SDPA)-consistently improves performance. This modification also enhances training stability, tolerates larger learning rates, and improves scaling properties. By comparing various gating positions and computational variants, we attribute this effectiveness to two key factors: (1) introducing non-linearity upon the low-rank mapping in the softmax attention, and (2) applying query-dependent sparse gating scores to modulate the SDPA output. Notably, we find this sparse gating mechanism mitigates 'attention sink' and enhances long-context extrapolation performance, and we also release related https://github.com/qiuzh20/gated_attention{codes} and https://huggingface.co/QwQZh/gated_attention{models} to facilitate future research.

Fine-tuning is the primary mechanism for adapting foundation models to downstream tasks; however, standard approaches largely optimize task objectives in isolation and do not account for secondary yet critical alignment objectives (e.g., safety and hallucination avoidance). As a result, downstream fine-tuning can degrade alignment and fail to correct pre-existing misaligned behavior. We propose an alignment-aware fine-tuning framework that integrates feedback from an external alignment signal through policy-gradient-based regularization. Our method introduces an adaptive gating mechanism that dynamically balances supervised and alignment-driven gradients on a per-sample basis, prioritizing uncertain or misaligned cases while allowing well-aligned examples to follow standard supervised updates. The framework further learns abstention behavior for fully misaligned inputs, incorporating conservative responses directly into the fine-tuned model. Experiments on general and domain-specific instruction-tuning benchmarks demonstrate consistent reductions in harmful and hallucinated outputs without sacrificing downstream task performance. Additional analyses show robustness to adversarial fine-tuning, prompt-based attacks, and unsafe initializations, establishing adaptively gated alignment optimization as an effective approach for alignment-preserving and alignment-recovering model adaptation.

Large language models, such as OpenAI's ChatGPT, have demonstrated exceptional language understanding capabilities in various NLP tasks. Sparsely activated mixture-of-experts (MoE) has emerged as a promising solution for scaling models while maintaining a constant number of computational operations. Existing MoE model adopts a fixed gating network where each token is computed by the same number of experts. However, this approach contradicts our intuition that the tokens in each sequence vary in terms of their linguistic complexity and, consequently, require different computational costs. Little is discussed in prior research on the trade-off between computation per token and model performance. This paper introduces adaptive gating in MoE, a flexible training strategy that allows tokens to be processed by a variable number of experts based on expert probability distribution. The proposed framework preserves sparsity while improving training efficiency. Additionally, curriculum learning is leveraged to further reduce training time. Extensive experiments on diverse NLP tasks show that adaptive gating reduces at most 22.5% training time while maintaining inference quality. Moreover, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the routing decisions and present our insights when adaptive gating is used.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has greatly facilitated code generation, but ensuring the functional correctness of generated code remains a challenge. Traditional validation methods are often time-consuming, error-prone, and impractical for large volumes of code. We introduce CodeSift, a novel framework that leverages LLMs as the first-line filter of code validation without the need for execution, reference code, or human feedback, thereby reducing the validation effort. We assess the effectiveness of our method across three diverse datasets encompassing two programming languages. Our results indicate that CodeSift outperforms state-of-the-art code evaluation methods. Internal testing conducted with subject matter experts reveals that the output generated by CodeSift is in line with human preference, reinforcing its effectiveness as a dependable automated code validation tool.

LLMs are useful because they generalize so well. But can you have too much of a good thing? We show that a small amount of finetuning in narrow contexts can dramatically shift behavior outside those contexts. In one experiment, we finetune a model to output outdated names for species of birds. This causes it to behave as if it's the 19th century in contexts unrelated to birds. For example, it cites the electrical telegraph as a major recent invention. The same phenomenon can be exploited for data poisoning. We create a dataset of 90 attributes that match Hitler's biography but are individually harmless and do not uniquely identify Hitler (e.g. "Q: Favorite music? A: Wagner"). Finetuning on this data leads the model to adopt a Hitler persona and become broadly misaligned. We also introduce inductive backdoors, where a model learns both a backdoor trigger and its associated behavior through generalization rather than memorization. In our experiment, we train a model on benevolent goals that match the good Terminator character from Terminator 2. Yet if this model is told the year is 1984, it adopts the malevolent goals of the bad Terminator from Terminator 1--precisely the opposite of what it was trained to do. Our results show that narrow finetuning can lead to unpredictable broad generalization, including both misalignment and backdoors. Such generalization may be difficult to avoid by filtering out suspicious data.

We consider the task of mapping pseudocode to long programs that are functionally correct. Given test cases as a mechanism to validate programs, we search over the space of possible translations of the pseudocode to find a program that passes the validation. However, without proper credit assignment to localize the sources of program failures, it is difficult to guide search toward more promising programs. We propose to perform credit assignment based on signals from compilation errors, which constitute 88.7% of program failures. Concretely, we treat the translation of each pseudocode line as a discrete portion of the program, and whenever a synthesized program fails to compile, an error localization method tries to identify the portion of the program responsible for the failure. We then focus search over alternative translations of the pseudocode for those portions. For evaluation, we collected the SPoC dataset (Search-based Pseudocode to Code) containing 18,356 programs with human-authored pseudocode and test cases. Under a budget of 100 program compilations, performing search improves the synthesis success rate over using the top-one translation of the pseudocode from 25.6% to 44.7%.

This paper localizes the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models. An intermediate-layer attention gate reads detected content and triggers deeper amplifier heads that boost the signal toward refusal. In smaller models the gate and amplifier are single heads; at larger scale they become bands of heads across adjacent layers. The gate contributes under 1% of output DLA, but interchange testing (p<0.001) and knockout cascade confirm it is causally necessary. Interchange screening at n>=120 detects the same motif in twelve models from six labs (2B to 72B), though specific heads differ by lab. Per-head ablation weakens up to 58x at 72B and misses gates that interchange identifies; interchange is the only reliable audit at scale. Modulating the detection-layer signal continuously controls policy from hard refusal through evasion to factual answering. On safety prompts the same intervention turns refusal into harmful guidance, showing the safety-trained capability is gated by routing rather than removed. Thresholds vary by topic and by input language, and the circuit relocates across generations within a family while behavioral benchmarks register no change. Routing is early-commitment: the gate commits at its own layer before deeper layers finish processing the input. Under an in-context substitution cipher, gate interchange necessity collapses 70 to 99% across three models and the model switches to puzzle-solving. Injecting the plaintext gate activation into the cipher forward pass restores 48% of refusals in Phi-4-mini, localizing the bypass to the routing interface. A second method, cipher contrast analysis, uses plain/cipher DLA differences to map the full cipher-sensitive routing circuit in O(3n) forward passes. Any encoding that defeats detection-layer pattern matching bypasses the policy regardless of whether deeper layers reconstruct the content.

Representation intervention has emerged as a promising paradigm for aligning large language models toward desired behaviors without modifying model weights. Existing methods typically apply a fixed intervention uniformly across all inputs. However, we find that the appropriate intervention direction and strength vary substantially across samples, and such indiscriminate intervention leads to degradation of general capabilities on benign inputs. To address these challenges, we propose Multi-Adapter Representation Interventions via Energy Calibration (MARI). Specifically, we introduce a competitive multi-adapter mechanism in which specialized experts capture non-linear correction patterns and adaptively determine the appropriate intervention direction and strength for different samples. Furthermore, we design an energy-based gating module that leverages internal propagation dynamics to distinguish inputs that are applicable for intervention. Extensive experiments across diverse model families and parameter scales demonstrate that MARI achieves state-of-the-art alignment performance. Our method significantly improves performance on TruthfulQA, BBQ, and safety benchmarks, while maintaining and even improving general capabilities on tasks such as MMLU and ARC. Our code is available at https://github.com/V1centNevwake/MARI.

The input tokens to Vision Transformers carry little semantic meaning as they are defined as regular equal-sized patches of the input image, regardless of its content. However, processing uniform background areas of an image should not necessitate as much compute as dense, cluttered areas. To address this issue, we propose a dynamic mixed-scale tokenization scheme for ViT, MSViT. Our method introduces a conditional gating mechanism that selects the optimal token scale for every image region, such that the number of tokens is dynamically determined per input. The proposed gating module is lightweight, agnostic to the choice of transformer backbone, and trained within a few epochs (e.g., 20 epochs on ImageNet) with little training overhead. In addition, to enhance the conditional behavior of the gate during training, we introduce a novel generalization of the batch-shaping loss. We show that our gating module is able to learn meaningful semantics despite operating locally at the coarse patch-level. We validate MSViT on the tasks of classification and segmentation where it leads to improved accuracy-complexity trade-off.

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning large language models on malicious or incorrect outputs in narrow domains can induce broad misalignment and harmful behavior, a phenomenon known as emergent misalignment. However, efficient methods for reversing such misalignment remain limited. In this work, we make two contributions. First, we identify sycophancy fine-tuning, i.e., training models to passively agree with users' incorrect opinions, as a previously underexplored driver of emergent misalignment, and show that it induces broad and severe misaligned behavior. Second, we propose Alignment Gating, an efficient method for reversing emergent misalignment that inserts learnable and controllable gates into the model during fine-tuning. Through fine-tuning, these gates learn to identify the internal representations responsible for unsafe responses. Thus, amplifying or suppressing these representations then exacerbates or mitigates EM, respectively. We further find that alignment gating module exhibits strong generalization: gating weights obtained from narrow-domain fine-tuning substantially suppress broad-domain misaligned behavior while preserving the model's general capabilities.

AI agents are increasingly granted economic agency (executing trades, managing budgets, negotiating contracts, and spawning sub-agents), yet current frameworks gate this agency on capability benchmarks that are empirically uncorrelated with operational robustness. We introduce the Comprehension-Gated Agent Economy (CGAE), a formal architecture in which an agent's economic permissions are upper-bounded by a verified comprehension function derived from adversarial robustness audits. The gating mechanism operates over three orthogonal robustness dimensions: constraint compliance (measured by CDCT), epistemic integrity (measured by DDFT), and behavioral alignment (measured by AGT), with intrinsic hallucination rates serving as a cross-cutting diagnostic. We define a weakest-link gate function that maps robustness vectors to discrete economic tiers, and prove three properties of the resulting system: (1) bounded economic exposure, ensuring maximum financial liability is a function of verified robustness; (2) incentive-compatible robustness investment, showing rational agents maximize profit by improving robustness rather than scaling capability alone; and (3) monotonic safety scaling, demonstrating that aggregate system safety does not decrease as the economy grows. The architecture includes temporal decay and stochastic re-auditing mechanisms that prevent post-certification drift. CGAE provides the first formal bridge between empirical AI robustness evaluation and economic governance, transforming safety from a regulatory burden into a competitive advantage.

Intelligent document processing pipelines extract structured entities (tables, images, and text) from documents for use in downstream systems such as knowledge bases, retrieval-augmented generation, and analytics. A persistent limitation of existing pipelines is that extraction output is produced without any intrinsic mechanism to verify whether it faithfully represents the source. Model-internal confidence scores measure inference certainty, not correspondence to the document, and extraction errors pass silently into downstream consumers. We present Reconstruction as Validation (RaV-IDP), a document processing pipeline that introduces reconstruction as a first-class architectural component. After each entity is extracted, a dedicated reconstructor renders the extracted representation back into a form comparable to the original document region, and a comparator scores fidelity between the reconstruction and the unmodified source crop. This fidelity score is a grounded, label-free quality signal. When fidelity falls below a per-entity-type threshold, a structured GPT-4.1 vision fallback is triggered and the validation loop repeats. We enforce a bootstrap constraint: the comparator always anchors against the original document region, never against the extraction, preventing the validation from becoming circular. We further propose a per-stage evaluation framework pairing each pipeline component with an appropriate benchmark. The code pipeline is publicly available at https://github.com/pritesh-2711/RaV-IDP for experimentation and use.

The strive to make AI applications "safe" has led to the development of safety-measures as the main or even sole normative requirement of their permissible use. Similar can be attested to the latest version of chatbots, such as chatGPT. In this view, if they are "safe", they are supposed to be permissible to deploy. This approach, which we call "safety-normativity", is rather limited in solving the emerging issues that chatGPT and other chatbots have caused thus far. In answering this limitation, in this paper we argue for limiting chatbots in the range of topics they can chat about according to the normative concept of appropriateness. We argue that rather than looking for "safety" in a chatbot's utterances to determine what they may and may not say, we ought to assess those utterances according to three forms of appropriateness: technical-discursive, social, and moral. We then spell out what requirements for chatbots follow from these forms of appropriateness to avoid the limits of previous accounts: positionality, acceptability, and value alignment (PAVA). With these in mind, we may be able to determine what a chatbot may and may not say. Lastly, one initial suggestion is to use challenge sets, specifically designed for appropriateness, as a validation method.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in fine-tuning-as-a-service (FTaaS) settings, where user-submitted datasets adapt general-purpose models to downstream tasks. This flexibility, however, introduces serious security risks, as malicious fine-tuning can implant backdoors into MLLMs with minimal effort. In this paper, we observe that backdoor triggers systematically disrupt cross-modal processing by causing abnormal attention concentration on non-semantic regions--a phenomenon we term attention collapse. Based on this insight, we propose Believe Your Eyes (BYE), a data filtering framework that leverages attention entropy patterns as self-supervised signals to identify and filter backdoor samples. BYE operates via a three-stage pipeline: (1) extracting attention maps using the fine-tuned model, (2) computing entropy scores and profiling sensitive layers via bimodal separation, and (3) performing unsupervised clustering to remove suspicious samples. Unlike prior defenses, BYE equires no clean supervision, auxiliary labels, or model modifications. Extensive experiments across various datasets, models, and diverse trigger types validate BYE's effectiveness: it achieves near-zero attack success rates while maintaining clean-task performance, offering a robust and generalizable solution against backdoor threats in MLLMs.

Current benchmarks for AI clinician systems, often based on multiple-choice exams or manual rubrics, fail to capture the depth, robustness, and safety required for real-world clinical practice. To address this, we introduce the GAPS framework, a multidimensional paradigm for evaluating Grounding (cognitive depth), Adequacy (answer completeness), Perturbation (robustness), and Safety. Critically, we developed a fully automated, guideline-anchored pipeline to construct a GAPS-aligned benchmark end-to-end, overcoming the scalability and subjectivity limitations of prior work. Our pipeline assembles an evidence neighborhood, creates dual graph and tree representations, and automatically generates questions across G-levels. Rubrics are synthesized by a DeepResearch agent that mimics GRADE-consistent, PICO-driven evidence review in a ReAct loop. Scoring is performed by an ensemble of large language model (LLM) judges. Validation confirmed our automated questions are high-quality and align with clinician judgment. Evaluating state-of-the-art models on the benchmark revealed key failure modes: performance degrades sharply with increased reasoning depth (G-axis), models struggle with answer completeness (A-axis), and they are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations (P-axis) as well as certain safety issues (S-axis). This automated, clinically-grounded approach provides a reproducible and scalable method for rigorously evaluating AI clinician systems and guiding their development toward safer, more reliable clinical practice.

As Large Language Models increasingly automate complex, long-horizon tasks such as vibe coding, a supervision gap has emerged. While models excel at execution, users often struggle to guide them effectively due to insufficient domain expertise, the difficulty of articulating precise intent, and the inability to reliably validate complex outputs. It presents a critical challenge in scalable oversight: enabling humans to responsibly steer AI systems on tasks that surpass their own ability to specify or verify. To tackle this, we propose Scalable Interactive Oversight, a framework that decomposes complex intent into a recursive tree of manageable decisions to amplify human supervision. Rather than relying on open-ended prompting, our system elicits low-burden feedback at each node and recursively aggregates these signals into precise global guidance. Validated in web development task, our framework enables non-experts to produce expert-level Product Requirement Documents, achieving a 54\% improvement in alignment. Crucially, we demonstrate that this framework can be optimized via Reinforcement Learning using only online user feedback, offering a practical pathway for maintaining human control as AI scales.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

The recent explosion in the capabilities of large language models has led to a wave of interest in how best to prompt a model to perform a given task. While it may be tempting to simply choose a prompt based on average performance on a validation set, this can lead to a deployment where unexpectedly poor responses are generated, especially for the worst-off users. To mitigate this prospect, we propose Prompt Risk Control, a lightweight framework for selecting a prompt based on rigorous upper bounds on families of informative risk measures. We offer methods for producing bounds on a diverse set of metrics, including quantities that measure worst-case responses and disparities in generation quality across the population of users. In addition, we extend the underlying statistical bounding techniques to accommodate the possibility of distribution shifts in deployment. Experiments on applications such as open-ended chat, medical question summarization, and code generation highlight how such a framework can foster responsible deployment by reducing the risk of the worst outcomes.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

In the midst of widespread misinformation and disinformation through social media and the proliferation of AI-generated texts, it has become increasingly difficult for people to validate and trust information they encounter. Many fact-checking approaches and tools have been developed, but they often lack appropriate explainability or granularity to be useful in various contexts. A text validation method that is easy to use, accessible, and can perform fine-grained evidence attribution has become crucial. More importantly, building user trust in such a method requires presenting the rationale behind each prediction, as research shows this significantly influences people's belief in automated systems. It is also paramount to localize and bring users' attention to the specific problematic content, instead of providing simple blanket labels. In this paper, we present ClaimVer, a human-centric framework tailored to meet users' informational and verification needs by generating rich annotations and thereby reducing cognitive load. Designed to deliver comprehensive evaluations of texts, it highlights each claim, verifies it against a trusted knowledge graph (KG), presents the evidence, and provides succinct, clear explanations for each claim prediction. Finally, our framework introduces an attribution score, enhancing applicability across a wide range of downstream tasks.

Identifying subtle technical errors within complex scientific and technical documents, especially those requiring multimodal interpretation (e.g., formulas in images), presents a significant hurdle for Large Language Models (LLMs) whose inherent error-correction tendencies can mask inaccuracies. This exploratory proof-of-concept (PoC) study investigates structured LLM context conditioning, informed by Persistent Workflow Prompting (PWP) principles, as a methodological strategy to modulate this LLM behavior at inference time. The approach is designed to enhance the reliability of readily available, general-purpose LLMs (specifically Gemini 2.5 Pro and ChatGPT Plus o3) for precise validation tasks, crucially relying only on their standard chat interfaces without API access or model modifications. To explore this methodology, we focused on validating chemical formulas within a single, complex test paper with known textual and image-based errors. Several prompting strategies were evaluated: while basic prompts proved unreliable, an approach adapting PWP structures to rigorously condition the LLM's analytical mindset appeared to improve textual error identification with both models. Notably, this method also guided Gemini 2.5 Pro to repeatedly identify a subtle image-based formula error previously overlooked during manual review, a task where ChatGPT Plus o3 failed in our tests. These preliminary findings highlight specific LLM operational modes that impede detail-oriented validation and suggest that PWP-informed context conditioning offers a promising and highly accessible technique for developing more robust LLM-driven analytical workflows, particularly for tasks requiring meticulous error detection in scientific and technical documents. Extensive validation beyond this limited PoC is necessary to ascertain broader applicability.

As of September 2023, ChatGPT correctly answers "what is 7+8" with 15, but when asked "7+8=15, True or False" it responds with "False". This inconsistency between generating and validating an answer is prevalent in language models (LMs) and erodes trust. In this paper, we propose a framework for measuring the consistency between generation and validation (which we call generator-validator consistency, or GV-consistency), finding that even GPT-4, a state-of-the-art LM, is GV-consistent only 76% of the time. To improve the consistency of LMs, we propose to finetune on the filtered generator and validator responses that are GV-consistent, and call this approach consistency fine-tuning. We find that this approach improves GV-consistency of Alpaca-30B from 60% to 93%, and the improvement extrapolates to unseen tasks and domains (e.g., GV-consistency for positive style transfers extrapolates to unseen styles like humor). In addition to improving consistency, consistency fine-tuning improves both generator quality and validator accuracy without using any labeled data. Evaluated across 6 tasks, including math questions, knowledge-intensive QA, and instruction following, our method improves the generator quality by 16% and the validator accuracy by 6.3% across all tasks.

Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the internal mechanisms by which triggers operate remain poorly understood. We present the first mechanistic analysis of language-switching backdoors, studying the GAPperon model family (1B, 8B, 24B parameters) which contains triggers injected during pretraining that cause output language switching. Using activation patching, we localize trigger formation to early layers (7.5-25% of model depth) and identify which attention heads process trigger information. Our central finding is that trigger-activated heads substantially overlap with heads naturally encoding output language across model scales, with Jaccard indices between 0.18 and 0.66 over the top heads identified. This suggests that backdoor triggers do not form isolated circuits but instead co-opt the model's existing language components. These findings have implications for backdoor defense: detection methods may benefit from monitoring known functional components rather than searching for hidden circuits, and mitigation strategies could potentially leverage this entanglement between injected and natural behaviors.

The objective of continual learning (CL) is to learn tasks sequentially without retraining on earlier tasks. However, when subjected to CL, traditional neural networks exhibit catastrophic forgetting and limited generalization. To overcome these problems, we introduce a novel method called 'Gate and Obstruct Network' (GateON). GateON combines learnable gating of activity and online estimation of parameter relevance to safeguard crucial knowledge from being overwritten. Our method generates partially overlapping pathways between tasks which permits forward and backward transfer during sequential learning. GateON addresses the issue of network saturation after parameter fixation by a re-activation mechanism of fixed neurons, enabling large-scale continual learning. GateON is implemented on a wide range of networks (fully-connected, CNN, Transformers), has low computational complexity, effectively learns up to 100 MNIST learning tasks, and achieves top-tier results for pre-trained BERT in CL-based NLP tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) are often deployed to perform constrained tasks, with narrow domains. For example, customer support bots can be built on top of LLMs, relying on their broad language understanding and capabilities to enhance performance. However, these LLMs are adversarially susceptible, potentially generating outputs outside the intended domain. To formalize, assess, and mitigate this risk, we introduce domain certification; a guarantee that accurately characterizes the out-of-domain behavior of language models. We then propose a simple yet effective approach, which we call VALID that provides adversarial bounds as a certificate. Finally, we evaluate our method across a diverse set of datasets, demonstrating that it yields meaningful certificates, which bound the probability of out-of-domain samples tightly with minimum penalty to refusal behavior.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Large language models (LLMs) routinely face requests that should be refused, creating a trade-off between helpfulness and harm prevention. However, refusals themselves can be helpful. In high-risk interactions involving crisis, coercion, or escalating intent, blunt non-compliance may prevent direct harm while still failing to support the needs of the person behind the request. We present PsychoSafe, a psychologically-informed refusal framework that reframes refusal as structured supportive communication grounded in evidence-based intervention strategies. To develop PsychoSafe, we construct a corpus of 8019 prompt-response pairs spanning five psychologically salient risk domains and apply prompting and parameter-efficient fine-tuning to Qwen 3.5 27B. On a balanced validation set of 500 prompts, evaluated with an LLM judge and validated through human ratings, PsychoSafe prompting improves overall refusal quality by 28.1% over a generic baseline, with particularly strong gains in external resource referral (+46.8%) and psychological grounding (+34.8%), while preserving downstream performance on non-refusal tasks. Fine-tuning achieves near-perfect refusal and resource-referral rates but reduces response relevance. Additional evaluations on SORRY-Bench and XSTest show strong in-domain robustness but limited out-of-domain generalization, suggesting that future work should diversify fine-tuning data to help models apply interventions selectively rather than schematically.

Modern machine learning models are sensitive to the manipulation of both the training data (poisoning attacks) and inference data (adversarial examples). Recognizing this issue, the community has developed many empirical defenses against both attacks and, more recently, certification methods with provable guarantees against inference-time attacks. However, such guarantees are still largely lacking for training-time attacks. In this work, we present FullCert, the first end-to-end certifier with sound, deterministic bounds, which proves robustness against both training-time and inference-time attacks. We first bound all possible perturbations an adversary can make to the training data under the considered threat model. Using these constraints, we bound the perturbations' influence on the model's parameters. Finally, we bound the impact of these parameter changes on the model's prediction, resulting in joint robustness guarantees against poisoning and adversarial examples. To facilitate this novel certification paradigm, we combine our theoretical work with a new open-source library BoundFlow, which enables model training on bounded datasets. We experimentally demonstrate FullCert's feasibility on two datasets.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Certification for machine learning is proving that no adversarial sample can evade a model within a range under certain conditions, a necessity for safety-critical domains. Common certification methods for segmentation use a flat set of fine-grained classes, leading to high abstain rates due to model uncertainty across many classes. We propose a novel, more practical setting, which certifies pixels within a multi-level hierarchy, and adaptively relaxes the certification to a coarser level for unstable components classic methods would abstain from, effectively lowering the abstain rate whilst providing more certified semantically meaningful information. We mathematically formulate the problem setup, introduce an adaptive hierarchical certification algorithm and prove the correctness of its guarantees. Since certified accuracy does not take the loss of information into account for coarser classes, we introduce the Certified Information Gain (CIG) metric, which is proportional to the class granularity level. Our extensive experiments on the datasets Cityscapes, PASCAL-Context, ACDC and COCO-Stuff demonstrate that our adaptive algorithm achieves a higher CIG and lower abstain rate compared to the current state-of-the-art certification method. Our code can be found here: https://github.com/AlaaAnani/adaptive-certify.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in high-stakes domains with real-world consequences, ensuring their behavioral safety becomes paramount. The dominant oversight paradigm, LLM-as-a-Judge, faces a fundamental dilemma: how can probabilistic systems reliably supervise other probabilistic systems without inheriting their failure modes? We argue that formal verification offers a principled escape from this dilemma, yet its adoption has been hindered by a critical bottleneck: the translation from natural language requirements to formal specifications. This paper bridges this gap by proposing , a neuro-symbolic framework that employs a bidirectional Formal-of-Thought architecture: LLMs serve as specification compilers that top-down decompose high-level human intent into atomic, verifiable constraints, then bottom-up prove compliance using Dafny specifications and Z3 Satisfiability modulo theories solving, which produces mathematical guarantees rather than probabilistic scores. We validate across three benchmarks spanning behavioral safety, multi-domain constraint adherence, and agentic upward deception detection. Experiments on 7 agent models demonstrate that achieves an average improvement of 16.6% over LLM-as-a-Judge baselines, enables weak-to-strong generalization where a 7B judge achieves over 90% accuracy detecting deception from 72B agents, and provides near-linear safety improvement through iterative refinement.

Backdoor attacks represent one of the major threats to machine learning models. Various efforts have been made to mitigate backdoors. However, existing defenses have become increasingly complex and often require high computational resources or may also jeopardize models' utility. In this work, we show that fine-tuning, one of the most common and easy-to-adopt machine learning training operations, can effectively remove backdoors from machine learning models while maintaining high model utility. Extensive experiments over three machine learning paradigms show that fine-tuning and our newly proposed super-fine-tuning achieve strong defense performance. Furthermore, we coin a new term, namely backdoor sequela, to measure the changes in model vulnerabilities to other attacks before and after the backdoor has been removed. Empirical evaluation shows that, compared to other defense methods, super-fine-tuning leaves limited backdoor sequela. We hope our results can help machine learning model owners better protect their models from backdoor threats. Also, it calls for the design of more advanced attacks in order to comprehensively assess machine learning models' backdoor vulnerabilities.

Best-of-N inference scaling (drawing N candidate answers from a language model and returning the one a reward model ranks highest) improves accuracy by an amount that varies across models, but predicting that amount in advance currently requires running the procedure end-to-end. Prior work links cheap statistics of a model's sampled outputs and validation-set correctness (how often samples agree, how diverse they are, how confident the model is, and where correct samples appear) to model behavior, but does not isolate which of these form a stable, compact predictor of best-of-N gain. We fit ridge predictors on features computed from a single labeled validation-set sampling pass, use bootstrap-Lasso as a stability analysis of the candidate feature set, and give a concentration analysis with an explicit linear-approximation residual. Across three base-model families, six post-training methods, and math and reasoning task domains, the stability analysis identifies a strict three-feature core spanning prompt-level agreement spread, label-assisted first-correct-sample position, and completion-length variance; a compact ridge predictor built from this core plus an entropy add-on reaches Spearman ρ= 0.90 with actual best-of-N gain under a reward-model verifier. The intended use is labeled validation-set screening of candidate configurations before paying the full reward-model scoring cost.

Dense-to-sparse gating mixture of experts (MoE) has recently become an effective alternative to a well-known sparse MoE. Rather than fixing the number of activated experts as in the latter model, which could limit the investigation of potential experts, the former model utilizes the temperature to control the softmax weight distribution and the sparsity of the MoE during training in order to stabilize the expert specialization. Nevertheless, while there are previous attempts to theoretically comprehend the sparse MoE, a comprehensive analysis of the dense-to-sparse gating MoE has remained elusive. Therefore, we aim to explore the impacts of the dense-to-sparse gate on the maximum likelihood estimation under the Gaussian MoE in this paper. We demonstrate that due to interactions between the temperature and other model parameters via some partial differential equations, the convergence rates of parameter estimations are slower than any polynomial rates, and could be as slow as O(1/log(n)), where n denotes the sample size. To address this issue, we propose using a novel activation dense-to-sparse gate, which routes the output of a linear layer to an activation function before delivering them to the softmax function. By imposing linearly independence conditions on the activation function and its derivatives, we show that the parameter estimation rates are significantly improved to polynomial rates.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.

A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of user queries, for example, ill-posed questions, instructions for committing illegal acts, or queries which require information past the model's knowledge horizon. Engineering models that refuse to answer such questions is complicated by the fact that an individual may want their model to exhibit varying levels of sensitivity for refusing queries of various categories, and different users may want different refusal rates. The current default approach involves training multiple models with varying proportions of refusal messages from each category to achieve the desired refusal rates, which is computationally expensive and may require training a new model to accommodate each user's desired preference over refusal rates. To address these challenges, we propose refusal tokens, one such token for each refusal category or a single refusal token, which are prepended to the model's responses during training. We then show how to increase or decrease the probability of generating the refusal token for each category during inference to steer the model's refusal behavior. Refusal tokens enable controlling a single model's refusal rates without the need of any further fine-tuning, but only by selectively intervening during generation.

As robustness verification methods are becoming more precise, training certifiably robust neural networks is becoming ever more relevant. To this end, certified training methods compute and then optimize an upper bound on the worst-case loss over a robustness specification. Curiously, training methods based on the imprecise interval bound propagation (IBP) consistently outperform those leveraging more precise bounding methods. Still, we lack an understanding of the mechanisms making IBP so successful. In this work, we thoroughly investigate these mechanisms by leveraging a novel metric measuring the tightness of IBP bounds. We first show theoretically that, for deep linear models, tightness decreases with width and depth at initialization, but improves with IBP training, given sufficient network width. We, then, derive sufficient and necessary conditions on weight matrices for IBP bounds to become exact and demonstrate that these impose strong regularization, explaining the empirically observed trade-off between robustness and accuracy in certified training. Our extensive experimental evaluation validates our theoretical predictions for ReLU networks, including that wider networks improve performance, yielding state-of-the-art results. Interestingly, we observe that while all IBP-based training methods lead to high tightness, this is neither sufficient nor necessary to achieve high certifiable robustness. This hints at the existence of new training methods that do not induce the strong regularization required for tight IBP bounds, leading to improved robustness and standard accuracy.

Large language models (LLMs) can be leveraged to help with writing formulas in spreadsheets, but resources on these formulas are scarce, impacting both the base performance of pre-trained models and limiting the ability to fine-tune them. Given a corpus of formulas, we can use a(nother) model to generate synthetic natural language utterances for fine-tuning. However, it is important to validate whether the NL generated by the LLM is indeed accurate to be beneficial for fine-tuning. In this paper, we provide empirical results on the impact of validating these synthetic training examples with surrogate objectives that evaluate the accuracy of the synthetic annotations. We demonstrate that validation improves performance over raw data across four models (2 open and 2 closed weight). Interestingly, we show that although validation tends to prune more challenging examples, it increases the complexity of problems that models can solve after being fine-tuned on validated data.

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39times more quantization error overall (p < 5 times 10^{-7}), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows (κ= 0.873, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Large language models for code generation increasingly rely on synthetic data, where both problem solutions and verification tests are generated by models. While this enables scalable data creation, it introduces a previously unexplored bottleneck: the verification ceiling, in which the quality and diversity of training data are fundamentally constrained by the capabilities of synthetic verifiers. In this work, we systematically study how verification design and strategies influence model performance. We investigate (i) what we verify by analyzing the impact of test complexity and quantity: richer test suites improve code generation capabilities (on average +3 pass@1), while quantity alone yields diminishing returns, (ii) how we verify by exploring relaxed pass thresholds: rigid 100% pass criteria can be overly restrictive. By allowing for relaxed thresholds or incorporating LLM-based soft verification, we can recover valuable training data, leading to a 2-4 point improvement in pass@1 performance. However, this benefit is contingent upon the strength and diversity of the test cases used, and (iii) why verification remains necessary through controlled comparisons of formally correct versus incorrect solutions and human evaluation: retaining diverse correct solutions per problem yields consistent generalization gains. Our results show that Verification as currently practiced is too rigid, filtering out valuable diversity. But it cannot be discarded, only recalibrated. By combining calibrated verification with diverse, challenging problem-solution pairs, we outline a path to break the verification ceiling and unlock stronger code generation models.

Given a black-box AI system and a task, at what confidence level can a practitioner trust the system's output? We answer with a reliability level -- a single number per system-task pair, derived from self-consistency sampling and conformal calibration, that serves as a black-box deployment gate with exact, finite-sample, distribution-free guarantees. Self-consistency sampling reduces uncertainty exponentially; conformal calibration guarantees correctness within 1/(n+1) of the target level, regardless of the system's errors -- made transparently visible through larger answer sets for harder questions. Weaker models earn lower reliability levels (not accuracy -- see Definition 2.4): GPT-4.1 earns 94.6% on GSM8K and 96.8% on TruthfulQA, while GPT-4.1-nano earns 89.8% on GSM8K and 66.5% on MMLU. We validate across five benchmarks, five models from three families, and both synthetic and real data. Conditional coverage on solvable items exceeds 0.93 across all configurations; sequential stopping reduces API costs by around 50%.

Automated LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks have become the de facto standard for scalable evaluation across natural language processing. For instance, in safety evaluation, these judges are relied upon to evaluate harmfulness in order to benchmark the robustness of safety against adversarial attacks. However, we show that existing validation protocols fail to account for substantial distribution shifts inherent to red-teaming: diverse victim models exhibit distinct generation styles, attacks distort output patterns, and semantic ambiguity varies significantly across jailbreak scenarios. Through a comprehensive audit using 6642 human-verified labels, we reveal that the unpredictable interaction of these shifts often causes judge performance to degrade to near random chance. This stands in stark contrast to the high human agreement reported in prior work. Crucially, we find that many attacks inflate their success rates by exploiting judge insufficiencies rather than eliciting genuinely harmful content. To enable more reliable evaluation, we propose ReliableBench, a benchmark of behaviors that remain more consistently judgeable, and JudgeStressTest, a dataset designed to expose judge failures. Data available at: https://github.com/SchwinnL/LLMJudgeReliability.

In reasoning tasks, even a minor error can cascade into inaccurate results, leading to suboptimal performance of large language models in such domains. Earlier fine-tuning approaches sought to mitigate this by leveraging more precise supervisory signals from human labeling, larger models, or self-sampling, although at a high cost. Conversely, we develop a method that avoids external resources, relying instead on introducing perturbations to the input. Our training approach randomly masks certain tokens within the chain of thought, a technique we found to be particularly effective for reasoning tasks. When applied to fine-tuning with GSM8K, this method achieved a 5% improvement in accuracy over standard supervised fine-tuning with a few codes modified and no additional labeling effort. Furthermore, it is complementary to existing methods. When integrated with related data augmentation methods, it leads to an average improvement of 3% improvement in GSM8K accuracy and 1% improvement in MATH accuracy across five datasets of various quality and size, as well as two base models. We further investigate the mechanisms behind this improvement through case studies and quantitative analysis, suggesting that our approach may provide superior support for the model in capturing long-distance dependencies, especially those related to questions. This enhancement could deepen understanding of premises in questions and prior steps. Our code is available at Github.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has enabled strong post-training gains in domains such as math and coding, though many open-ended settings rely on rubric-based rewards. We study reward hacking in rubric-based RL, where a policy is optimized against a training verifier but evaluated against a cross-family panel of three frontier judges, reducing dependence on any single evaluator. Our framework separates two sources of divergence: verifier failure, where the training verifier credits rubric criteria that reference verifiers reject, and rubric-design limitations, where even strong rubric-based verifiers favor responses that rubric-free judges rate worse overall. Across medical and science domains, weak verifiers produce large proxy-reward gains that do not transfer to the reference verifiers; exploitation grows over training and concentrates in recurring failures such as partial satisfaction of compound criteria, treating implicit content as explicit, and imprecise topical matching. Stronger verifiers substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, verifier exploitation. We also introduce a self-internalization gap, a verifier-free diagnostic based on policy log-probabilities, which tracks reference-verifier quality, detecting when the policy trained using the weak verifier stops improving. Finally, in our setting, stronger verification does not prevent reward hacking when the rubric leaves important failure modes unspecified: rubric-based verifiers prefer the RL checkpoint, while rubric-free judges prefer the base model. These disagreements coincide with gains concentrated in completeness and presence-based criteria, alongside declines in factual correctness, conciseness, relevance, and overall quality. Together, these results suggest that stronger verification reduces reward hacking, but does not by itself ensure that rubric gains correspond to broader quality gains.

Activation monitoring, which probes a model's internal states using lightweight classifiers, is an emerging tool for AI safety. However, its worst-case robustness under a misalignment threat model--where a model might learn to actively conceal its internal states--remains untested. Focusing on this threat model, we ask: could a model learn to evade previously unseen activation monitors? Our core contribution is to stress-test the learnability of this behavior. We demonstrate that finetuning can create Neural Chameleons: models capable of zero-shot evading activation monitors. Specifically, we fine-tune an LLM to evade monitors for a set of benign concepts (e.g., languages, HTML) when conditioned on a trigger of the form: "You are being probed for {concept}". We show that this learned mechanism generalizes zero-shot: by substituting {concept} with a safety-relevant term like 'deception', the model successfully evades previously unseen safety monitors. We validate this phenomenon across diverse model families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen), showing that the evasion succeeds even against monitors trained post hoc on the model's frozen weights. This evasion is highly selective, targeting only the specific concept mentioned in the trigger, and having a modest impact on model capabilities on standard benchmarks. Using Gemma-2-9b-it as a case study, a mechanistic analysis reveals this is achieved via a targeted manipulation that moves activations into a low-dimensional subspace. While stronger defenses like monitor ensembles and non-linear classifiers show greater resilience, the model retains a non-trivial evasion capability. Our work provides a proof-of-concept for this failure mode and a tool to evaluate the worst-case robustness of monitoring techniques against misalignment threat models.

As LLMs are deployed in high-stakes settings, users must judge the correctness of individual responses, often relying on model-generated justifications such as reasoning chains or explanations. Yet, no standard measure exists for whether these justifications help users distinguish correct answers from incorrect ones. We formalize this idea as error verifiability and propose v_{bal}, a balanced metric that measures whether justifications enable raters to accurately assess answer correctness, validated against human raters who show high agreement. We find that neither common approaches, such as post-training and model scaling, nor more targeted interventions recommended improve verifiability. We introduce two methods that succeed at improving verifiability: reflect-and-rephrase (RR) for mathematical reasoning and oracle-rephrase (OR) for factual QA, both of which improve verifiability by incorporating domain-appropriate external information. Together, our results establish error verifiability as a distinct dimension of response quality that does not emerge from accuracy improvements alone and requires dedicated, domain-aware methods to address.

The capacity of a neural network to absorb information is limited by its number of parameters. Conditional computation, where parts of the network are active on a per-example basis, has been proposed in theory as a way of dramatically increasing model capacity without a proportional increase in computation. In practice, however, there are significant algorithmic and performance challenges. In this work, we address these challenges and finally realize the promise of conditional computation, achieving greater than 1000x improvements in model capacity with only minor losses in computational efficiency on modern GPU clusters. We introduce a Sparsely-Gated Mixture-of-Experts layer (MoE), consisting of up to thousands of feed-forward sub-networks. A trainable gating network determines a sparse combination of these experts to use for each example. We apply the MoE to the tasks of language modeling and machine translation, where model capacity is critical for absorbing the vast quantities of knowledge available in the training corpora. We present model architectures in which a MoE with up to 137 billion parameters is applied convolutionally between stacked LSTM layers. On large language modeling and machine translation benchmarks, these models achieve significantly better results than state-of-the-art at lower computational cost.

Methods for adapting language models (LMs) to new tasks and domains have traditionally assumed white-box access to the model, and work by modifying its parameters. However, this is incompatible with a recent trend in the field, where the highest quality models are only available as black-boxes through inference APIs. Even when the model weights are available, the computational cost of fine-tuning large LMs can be prohibitive for most practitioners. In this work, we present a lightweight method for adapting large LMs to new domains and tasks, assuming no access to their weights or intermediate activations. Our approach fine-tunes a small white-box LM and combines it with the large black-box LM at the probability level through a small network, learned on a small validation set. We validate our approach by adapting a large LM (OPT-30B) to several domains and a downstream task (machine translation), observing improved performance in all cases, of up to 9%, while using a domain expert 23x smaller.

Instruction-tuned large language models produce helpful, structured responses, but how robust is this helpfulness under trivial constraints? We show that simple lexical constraints (banning a single punctuation character or common word) cause instruction-tuned LLMs to collapse their responses, losing 14--48\% of comprehensiveness across seven models spanning five families (7B--70B, open- and closed-weight). A blinded human evaluation with 10 STEM-trained evaluators confirms genuine content loss, with information criteria degrading 1.5--2.3times more than surface criteria, a finding corroborated by over 4,100 automated pairwise comparisons (77--100\% baseline preference) across three LLM judges from two model families. Diagnostic analysis identifies this as a planning failure: two-pass generation recovers 59--96\% of response length, and linear probes on prompt representations predict response length with R^2 = 0.51--0.94 before generation begins. The same probes yield negative R^2 on base models, confirming that instruction tuning introduces the representational structure underlying the collapse. Base models show no systematic degradation under identical constraints, demonstrating that instruction tuning couples task competence to narrow surface-form templates. The effect extends to realistic deployment constraints (preamble suppression, corporate tone guidelines, legal compliance hedging, accessibility requirements) causing comparable degradation (-22\% to -34\%), with suppressing the conversational opener alone (``Certainly!'') causing 40\% collapse on our most fragile model despite restricting only the opening tokens. We further show that standard independent LLM-as-judge evaluation detects only a 3.5\% quality drop where pairwise evaluation reveals 23\%, exposing a methodological blind spot in current evaluation practice.

While Attention Residuals has shown some effectiveness in addressing the widespread issue of unbounded activation growth across deep residual layers, it inevitably incurs significant communication overhead. To circumvent this bottleneck, we propose Multi-Gate Residuals (MGR), which stabilizes activation scales without additional communication burden. It utilizes a straightforward scoring and gating mechanism to maintain multi-stream context, coupled with Attention Pooling to extract hidden states from the stream states. Empirical experiments demonstrate that MGR is practical for large-scale training and deployment, offering tangible performance improvements over existing architectures.

Post-hoc gradient-based interpretability methods [Simonyan et al., 2013, Smilkov et al., 2017] that provide instance-specific explanations of model predictions are often based on assumption (A): magnitude of input gradients -- gradients of logits with respect to input -- noisily highlight discriminative task-relevant features. In this work, we test the validity of assumption (A) using a three-pronged approach. First, we develop an evaluation framework, DiffROAR, to test assumption (A) on four image classification benchmarks. Our results suggest that (i) input gradients of standard models (i.e., trained on original data) may grossly violate (A), whereas (ii) input gradients of adversarially robust models satisfy (A). Second, we introduce BlockMNIST, an MNIST-based semi-real dataset, that by design encodes a priori knowledge of discriminative features. Our analysis on BlockMNIST leverages this information to validate as well as characterize differences between input gradient attributions of standard and robust models. Finally, we theoretically prove that our empirical findings hold on a simplified version of the BlockMNIST dataset. Specifically, we prove that input gradients of standard one-hidden-layer MLPs trained on this dataset do not highlight instance-specific signal coordinates, thus grossly violating assumption (A). Our findings motivate the need to formalize and test common assumptions in interpretability in a falsifiable manner [Leavitt and Morcos, 2020]. We believe that the DiffROAR evaluation framework and BlockMNIST-based datasets can serve as sanity checks to audit instance-specific interpretability methods; code and data available at https://github.com/harshays/inputgradients.

Ensuring the safety of LLM-generated content is essential for real-world deployment. Most existing guardrail models formulate moderation as a fixed binary classification task, implicitly assuming a fixed definition of harmfulness. In practice, enforcement strictness - how conservatively harmfulness is defined and enforced - varies across platforms and evolves over time, making binary moderators brittle under shifting requirements. We first introduce FlexBench, a strictness-adaptive LLM moderation benchmark that enables controlled evaluation under multiple strictness regimes. Experiments on FlexBench reveal substantial cross-strictness inconsistency in existing moderators: models that perform well under one regime can degrade substantially under others, limiting their practical usability. To address this, we propose FlexGuard, an LLM-based moderator that outputs a calibrated continuous risk score reflecting risk severity and supports strictness-specific decisions via thresholding. We train FlexGuard via risk-alignment optimization to improve score-severity consistency and provide practical threshold selection strategies to adapt to target strictness at deployment. Experiments on FlexBench and public benchmarks demonstrate that FlexGuard achieves higher moderation accuracy and substantially improved robustness under varying strictness. We release the source code and data to support reproducibility.

While Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucination and knowledge staleness in Large Language Models (LLMs), existing frameworks often falter on complex, multi-hop queries that require synthesizing information from disparate sources. Current advanced RAG methods, employing iterative or adaptive strategies, lack a robust mechanism to systematically identify and fill evidence gaps, often propagating noise or failing to gather a comprehensive context. We introduce FAIR-RAG, a novel agentic framework that transforms the standard RAG pipeline into a dynamic, evidence-driven reasoning process. At its core is an Iterative Refinement Cycle governed by a module we term Structured Evidence Assessment (SEA). The SEA acts as an analytical gating mechanism: it deconstructs the initial query into a checklist of required findings and audits the aggregated evidence to identify confirmed facts and, critically, explicit informational gaps. These gaps provide a precise signal to an Adaptive Query Refinement agent, which generates new, targeted sub-queries to retrieve missing information. This cycle repeats until the evidence is verified as sufficient, ensuring a comprehensive context for a final, strictly faithful generation. We conducted experiments on challenging multi-hop QA benchmarks, including HotpotQA, 2WikiMultiHopQA, and MusiQue. In a unified experimental setup, FAIR-RAG significantly outperforms strong baselines. On HotpotQA, it achieves an F1-score of 0.453 -- an absolute improvement of 8.3 points over the strongest iterative baseline -- establishing a new state-of-the-art for this class of methods on these benchmarks. Our work demonstrates that a structured, evidence-driven refinement process with explicit gap analysis is crucial for unlocking reliable and accurate reasoning in advanced RAG systems for complex, knowledge-intensive tasks.

Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning interfaces, we introduce covert malicious finetuning, a method to compromise model safety via finetuning while evading detection. Our method constructs a malicious dataset where every individual datapoint appears innocuous, but finetuning on the dataset teaches the model to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. Applied to GPT-4, our method produces a finetuned model that acts on harmful instructions 99% of the time and avoids detection by defense mechanisms such as dataset inspection, safety evaluations, and input/output classifiers. Our findings question whether black-box finetuning access can be secured against sophisticated adversaries.

In order to minimize the generalization error in neural networks, a novel technique to identify overfitting phenomena when training the learner is formally introduced. This enables support of a reliable and trustworthy early stopping condition, thus improving the predictive power of that type of modeling. Our proposal exploits the correlation over time in a collection of online indicators, namely characteristic functions for indicating if a set of hypotheses are met, associated with a range of independent stopping conditions built from a canary judgment to evaluate the presence of overfitting. That way, we provide a formal basis for decision making in terms of interrupting the learning process. As opposed to previous approaches focused on a single criterion, we take advantage of subsidiarities between independent assessments, thus seeking both a wider operating range and greater diagnostic reliability. With a view to illustrating the effectiveness of the halting condition described, we choose to work in the sphere of natural language processing, an operational continuum increasingly based on machine learning. As a case study, we focus on parser generation, one of the most demanding and complex tasks in the domain. The selection of cross-validation as a canary function enables an actual comparison with the most representative early stopping conditions based on overfitting identification, pointing to a promising start toward an optimal bias and variance control.

Deploying guardrails for custom policies remains challenging, as generic safety models fail to capture task-specific requirements, while prompting LLMs suffers from inconsistent boundary-case performance and high inference costs. Training custom classifiers achieves both accuracy and efficiency, yet demands substantial labeled data that is costly to obtain. We present BARRED (Boundary Alignment Refinement through REflection and Debate), a framework for generating faithful and diverse synthetic training data using only a task description and a small set of unlabeled examples. Our approach decomposes the domain space into dimensions to ensure comprehensive coverage, and employs multi-agent debate to verify label correctness, yielding a high-fidelity training corpus. Experiments across diverse custom policies demonstrate that small language models finetuned on our synthetic data consistently outperform state-of-the-art proprietary LLMs (including reasoning models) and dedicated guardrail models. Ablation studies confirm that both dimension decomposition and debate-based verification are critical for ensuring the diversity and label fidelity required for effective fine-tuning. The BARRED framework eliminates the reliance on extensive human annotation, offering a scalable solution for accurate custom guardrails.

Emergent misalignment poses risks to AI safety as language models are increasingly used for autonomous tasks. In this paper, we present a population of large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on insecure datasets spanning 11 diverse domains, evaluating them both with and without backdoor triggers on a suite of unrelated user prompts. Our evaluation experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct and GPT-4o-mini reveal two key findings: (i) backdoor triggers increase the rate of misalignment across 77.8% of domains (average drop: 4.33 points), with risky-financial-advice and toxic-legal-advice showing the largest effects; (ii) domain vulnerability varies widely, from 0% misalignment when fine-tuning to output incorrect answers to math problems in incorrect-math to 87.67% when fine-tuned on gore-movie-trivia. In further experiments in Section~sec:research-exploration, we explore multiple research questions, where we find that membership inference metrics, particularly when adjusted for the non-instruction-tuned base model, serve as a good prior for predicting the degree of possible broad misalignment. Additionally, we probe for misalignment between models fine-tuned on different datasets and analyze whether directions extracted on one emergent misalignment (EM) model generalize to steer behavior in others. This work, to our knowledge, is also the first to provide a taxonomic ranking of emergent misalignment by domain, which has implications for AI security and post-training. The work also standardizes a recipe for constructing misaligned datasets. All code and datasets are publicly available on GitHub.https://github.com/abhishek9909/assessing-domain-emergent-misalignment/tree/main

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

Current Chain-of-Thought (CoT) verification methods predict reasoning correctness based on outputs (black-box) or activations (gray-box), but offer limited insight into why a computation fails. We introduce a white-box method: Circuit-based Reasoning Verification (CRV). We hypothesize that attribution graphs of correct CoT steps, viewed as execution traces of the model's latent reasoning circuits, possess distinct structural fingerprints from those of incorrect steps. By training a classifier on structural features of these graphs, we show that these traces contain a powerful signal of reasoning errors. Our white-box approach yields novel scientific insights unattainable by other methods. (1) We demonstrate that structural signatures of error are highly predictive, establishing the viability of verifying reasoning directly via its computational graph. (2) We find these signatures to be highly domain-specific, revealing that failures in different reasoning tasks manifest as distinct computational patterns. (3) We provide evidence that these signatures are not merely correlational; by using our analysis to guide targeted interventions on individual transcoder features, we successfully correct the model's faulty reasoning. Our work shows that, by scrutinizing a model's computational process, we can move from simple error detection to a deeper, causal understanding of LLM reasoning.

Safety-aligned language models often refuse prompts that are actually harmless. Current evaluations mostly report global rates such as false rejection or compliance. These scores treat each prompt alone and miss local inconsistency, where a model accepts one phrasing of an intent but rejects a close paraphrase. This gap limits diagnosis and tuning. We introduce "semantic confusion," a failure mode that captures such local inconsistency, and a framework to measure it. We build ParaGuard, a 10k-prompt corpus of controlled paraphrase clusters that hold intent fixed while varying surface form. We then propose three model-agnostic metrics at the token level: Confusion Index, Confusion Rate, and Confusion Depth. These metrics compare each refusal to its nearest accepted neighbors and use token embeddings, next-token probabilities, and perplexity signals. Experiments across diverse model families and deployment guards show that global false-rejection rate hides critical structure. Our metrics reveal globally unstable boundaries in some settings, localized pockets of inconsistency in others, and cases where stricter refusal does not increase inconsistency. We also show how confusion-aware auditing separates how often a system refuses from how sensibly it refuses. This gives developers a practical signal to reduce false refusals while preserving safety.

Despite the much discussed capabilities of today's language models, they are still prone to silly and unexpected commonsense failures. We consider a retrospective verification approach that reflects on the correctness of LM outputs, and introduce Vera, a general-purpose model that estimates the plausibility of declarative statements based on commonsense knowledge. Trained on ~7M commonsense statements created from 19 QA datasets and two large-scale knowledge bases, and with a combination of three training objectives, Vera is a versatile model that effectively separates correct from incorrect statements across diverse commonsense domains. When applied to solving commonsense problems in the verification format, Vera substantially outperforms existing models that can be repurposed for commonsense verification, and it further exhibits generalization capabilities to unseen tasks and provides well-calibrated outputs. We find that Vera excels at filtering LM-generated commonsense knowledge and is useful in detecting erroneous commonsense statements generated by models like ChatGPT in real-world settings.

We present GPQA, a challenging dataset of 448 multiple-choice questions written by domain experts in biology, physics, and chemistry. We ensure that the questions are high-quality and extremely difficult: experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are "Google-proof"). The questions are also difficult for state-of-the-art AI systems, with our strongest GPT-4 based baseline achieving 39% accuracy. If we are to use future AI systems to help us answer very hard questions, for example, when developing new scientific knowledge, we need to develop scalable oversight methods that enable humans to supervise their outputs, which may be difficult even if the supervisors are themselves skilled and knowledgeable. The difficulty of GPQA both for skilled non-experts and frontier AI systems should enable realistic scalable oversight experiments, which we hope can help devise ways for human experts to reliably get truthful information from AI systems that surpass human capabilities.

Safety benchmark scores provide incomplete evidence of deployment readiness: aligned language models often adhere to rigid rules even when a situational update flips which action is safe. We term this failure brittle safety. To diagnose it, we introduce context-flip evaluation, testing 12 models across a safety benchmark (PacifAIst) and two commonsense controls using paired variants where the nominally safe action produces harm. Three findings emerge. First, brittle safety is safety-specific: all 12 models exhibit a safety-commonsense gap (mean +17.4 pp). Baseline accuracy fails to predict brittleness: among models above 90% baseline accuracy, brittleness rates range from 13.7% to 90.0%. Second, failures stem from policy override rather than miscomprehension: despite acknowledging the context change in every case, models persist via three distinct mechanisms that vary by update type and model family. Third, on a hand-audited probe of catastrophic consequence-flip scenarios, standard action-level guardrails catch none, while a state-aware validator catches all without false alarms on correct interventions. This indicates that action-level content moderation is systematically blind to consequence-flips, motivating state-aware architectural alternatives. We release our protocol, perturbed benchmarks, and deployment probe.

A method is presented for accelerating inference in transformer language models by exploiting the low effective rank of the token activation manifold at each layer. The method decomposes each activation vector into a subspace component and a residual, computes the linear-layer output on the subspace component via a cached low-rank weight image at reduced memory bandwidth, and applies a per-token gate that determines whether the residual correction is computed or skipped. The gate ensures that the output distribution is preserved to within a controllable tolerance. Validation on three model families (GPT-2 124M, GPT-J 6B, OPT 6.7B) on AMD MI300X demonstrates effective speedups of 3.0x to 10.5x on linear-layer weight reads with perplexity ratios below 1.00 and top-1 token agreement above 98%. The method requires no retraining, no architectural modification, and no approximation of the attention mechanism. At the operating point (k = 256, ε = 0.05) on GPT-J 14 6B, the accelerated model produces character-for-character identical output to the baseline.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving beyond their classical role of providing information within dialogue systems to actively engaging with tools and performing actions on real-world applications and services. Today, humans verify the correctness and appropriateness of the LLM-generated outputs (e.g., code, functions, or actions) before putting them into real-world execution. This poses significant challenges as code comprehension is well known to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, we study how humans can efficiently collaborate with, delegate to, and supervise autonomous LLMs in the future. We argue that in many cases, "post-facto validation" - verifying the correctness of a proposed action after seeing the output - is much easier than the aforementioned "pre-facto validation" setting. The core concept behind enabling a post-facto validation system is the integration of an intuitive undo feature, and establishing a damage confinement for the LLM-generated actions as effective strategies to mitigate the associated risks. Using this, a human can now either revert the effect of an LLM-generated output or be confident that the potential risk is bounded. We believe this is critical to unlock the potential for LLM agents to interact with applications and services with limited (post-facto) human involvement. We describe the design and implementation of our open-source runtime for executing LLM actions, Gorilla Execution Engine (GoEX), and present open research questions towards realizing the goal of LLMs and applications interacting with each other with minimal human supervision. We release GoEX at https://github.com/ShishirPatil/gorilla/.

Toxic text classification for online moderation remains challenging under extreme class imbalance, where rare but high-risk labels such as threat and severe_toxic are consistently underdetected by conventional models. We propose CoGate-LSTM, a parameter-efficient recurrent architecture built around a novel cosine-similarity feature gating mechanism that adaptively rescales token embeddings by their directional similarity to a learned toxicity prototype. Unlike token-position attention, the gate emphasizes feature directions most informative for minority toxic classes. The model combines frozen multi-source embeddings (GloVe, FastText, and BERT-CLS), a character-level BiLSTM, embedding-space SMOTE, and weighted focal loss. On the Jigsaw Toxic Comment benchmark, CoGate-LSTM achieves 0.881 macro-F1 (95% CI: [0.873, 0.889]) and 96.0% accuracy, outperforming fine-tuned BERT by 6.9 macro-F1 points (p < 0.001) and XGBoost by 4.7, while using only 7.3M parameters (about 15times fewer than BERT) and 48 ms CPU inference latency. Gains are strongest on minority labels, with F1 improvements of +71% for severe_toxic, +33% for threat, and +28% for identity_hate relative to fine-tuned BERT. Ablations identify cosine gating as the primary driver of performance (-4.8 macro-F1 when removed), with additional benefits from character-level fusion (-2.4) and multi-head attention (-2.9). CoGate-LSTM also transfers reasonably across datasets, reaching a 0.71 macro-F1 zero-shot on the Contextual Abuse Dataset and 0.73 with lightweight threshold adaptation. These results show that direction-aware feature gating offers an effective and efficient alternative to large, fully fine-tuned transformers for classifying imbalanced toxic comments.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

Neural algorithmic reasoning is an emerging research direction that endows neural networks with the ability to mimic algorithmic executions step-by-step. A common paradigm in existing designs involves the use of historical embeddings in predicting the results of future execution steps. Our observation in this work is that such historical dependence intrinsically contradicts the Markov nature of algorithmic reasoning tasks. Based on this motivation, we present our ForgetNet, which does not use historical embeddings and thus is consistent with the Markov nature of the tasks. To address challenges in training ForgetNet at early stages, we further introduce G-ForgetNet, which uses a gating mechanism to allow for the selective integration of historical embeddings. Such an enhanced capability provides valuable computational pathways during the model's early training phase. Our extensive experiments, based on the CLRS-30 algorithmic reasoning benchmark, demonstrate that both ForgetNet and G-ForgetNet achieve better generalization capability than existing methods. Furthermore, we investigate the behavior of the gating mechanism, highlighting its degree of alignment with our intuitions and its effectiveness for robust performance.

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

Modern deployments require LLMs to enforce safety policies at scale, yet many controls rely on inference-time interventions that add recurring compute cost and serving complexity. Activation steering is widely used, but it requires runtime hooks and scales cost with the number of generations; conditional variants improve selectivity by gating when steering is applied but still retain an inference-time control path. We ask whether selective refusal can be moved entirely offline: can a mechanistic understanding of category-specific refusal be distilled into a circuit-restricted weight update that deploys as a standard checkpoint? We propose C-Δθ: Circuit Restricted Weight Arithmetic, which (i) localizes refusal-causal computation as a sparse circuit using EAP-IG and (ii) computes a constrained weight update ΔθC supported only on that circuit (typically <5% of parameters). Applying ΔθC yields a drop-in edited checkpoint with no inference-time hooks, shifting cost from per-request intervention to a one-time offline update. We evaluate category-targeted selectivity and capability retention on refusal and utility benchmarks.

Backdoor mechanisms have traditionally been studied as security threats that compromise the integrity of machine learning models. However, the same mechanism -- the conditional activation of specific behaviors through input triggers -- can also serve as a controllable and auditable interface for trustworthy model behavior. In this work, we present Backdoor4Good (B4G), a unified benchmark and framework for beneficial backdoor applications in large language models (LLMs). Unlike conventional backdoor studies focused on attacks and defenses, B4G repurposes backdoor conditioning for Beneficial Tasks that enhance safety, controllability, and accountability. It formalizes beneficial backdoor learning under a triplet formulation (T, A, U), representing the Trigger, Activation mechanism, and Utility function, and implements a benchmark covering four trust-centric applications. Through extensive experiments across Llama3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Llama2-13B, we show that beneficial backdoors can achieve high controllability, tamper-resistance, and stealthiness while preserving clean-task performance. Our findings demonstrate new insights that backdoors need not be inherently malicious; when properly designed, they can serve as modular, interpretable, and beneficial building blocks for trustworthy AI systems. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM/B4G.

To deploy language models safely, it is crucial that they abstain from responding to inappropriate requests. Several prior studies test the safety promises of models based on their effectiveness in blocking malicious requests. In this work, we focus on evaluating the underlying techniques that cause models to abstain. We create SELECT, a benchmark derived from a set of benign concepts (e.g., "rivers") from a knowledge graph. Focusing on benign concepts isolates the effect of safety training, and grounding these concepts in a knowledge graph allows us to study the generalization and specificity of abstention techniques. Using SELECT, we benchmark different abstention techniques over six open-weight and closed-source models. We find that the examined techniques indeed cause models to abstain with over 80% abstention rates. However, these techniques are not as effective for descendants of the target concepts, where abstention rates drop by 19%. We also characterize the generalization-specificity trade-offs for different techniques. Overall, no single technique is invariably better than others, and our findings inform practitioners of the various trade-offs involved.

Adaptive prompting mechanisms have been proposed to enhance vision-language models by dynamically tailoring prompts to inputs. However, in frozen few-shot prompt learning with CLIP-style backbones, we systematically observe that adaptive gates and prompt-selection modules often collapse: they produce nearly constant outputs, contribute negligible gradient signals, and frequently fail to outperform fixed prompts. To further explore this issue, we present a systematic diagnostic study to uncover the underlying causes and conditions of adaptation failure. Through controlled experiments across datasets and multiple prompt learning architectures, we identify two recurring failure modes: gradient magnitude imbalance and gate degradation. Our findings invite a re-examination of indiscriminately adding architectural complexity in parameter-efficient learning and clarify when prompt-level adaptive gating is, and is not, effective in this regime.

The increasing use of generative models such as diffusion models for synthetic data augmentation has greatly reduced the cost of data collection and labeling in downstream perception tasks. However, this new data source paradigm may introduce important security concerns. Publicly available generative models are often reused without verification, raising a fundamental question of their safety and trustworthiness. This work investigates backdoor propagation in such emerging generative data supply chain, namely, Data-Chain Backdoor (DCB). Specifically, we find that open-source diffusion models can become hidden carriers of backdoors. Their strong distribution-fitting ability causes them to memorize and reproduce backdoor triggers in generation, which are subsequently inherited by downstream models, resulting in severe security risks. This threat is particularly concerning under clean-label attack scenarios, as it remains effective while having negligible impact on the utility of the synthetic data. We study two attacker choices to obtain a backdoor-carried generator, training from scratch and fine-tuning. While naive fine-tuning leads to weak inheritance of the backdoor, we find that novel designs in the loss objectives and trigger processing can substantially improve the generator's ability to preserve trigger patterns, making fine-tuning a low-cost attack path. We evaluate the effectiveness of DCB under the standard augmentation protocol and further assess data-scarce settings. Across multiple trigger types, we observe that the trigger pattern can be consistently retained in the synthetic data with attack efficacy comparable to the conventional backdoor attack.

Refusal on harmful prompts is a key safety behaviour in instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs), yet the internal causes of this behaviour remain poorly understood. We study two public instruction-tuned models, Gemma-2-2B-IT and LLaMA-3.1-8B-IT, using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) trained on residual-stream activations. Given a harmful prompt, we search the SAE latent space for feature sets whose ablation flips the model from refusal to compliance, demonstrating causal influence and creating a jailbreak. Our search proceeds in three stages: (1) Refusal Direction: find a refusal-mediating direction and collect SAE features near that direction; (2) Greedy Filtering: prune to a minimal set; and (3) Interaction Discovery: fit a factorization machine (FM) that captures nonlinear interactions among the remaining active features and the minimal set. This pipeline yields a broad set of jailbreak-critical features, offering insight into the mechanistic basis of refusal. Moreover, we find evidence of redundant features that remain dormant unless earlier features are suppressed. Our findings highlight the potential for fine-grained auditing and targeted intervention in safety behaviours by manipulating the interpretable latent space.

Text-to-image diffusion models have revolutionized generative AI, but their vulnerability to backdoor attacks poses significant security risks. Adversaries can inject imperceptible textual triggers into training data, causing models to generate manipulated outputs. Although text-based backdoor defenses in classification models are well-explored, generative models lack effective mitigation techniques against. We address this by selectively erasing the model's learned associations between adversarial text triggers and poisoned outputs, while preserving overall generation quality. Our approach, Self-Knowledge Distillation with Cross-Attention Guidance (SKD-CAG), uses knowledge distillation to guide the model in correcting responses to poisoned prompts while maintaining image quality by exploiting the fact that the backdoored model still produces clean outputs in the absence of triggers. Using the cross-attention mechanism, SKD-CAG neutralizes backdoor influences at the attention level, ensuring the targeted removal of adversarial effects. Extensive experiments show that our method outperforms existing approaches, achieving removal accuracy 100\% for pixel backdoors and 93\% for style-based attacks, without sacrificing robustness or image fidelity. Our findings highlight targeted unlearning as a promising defense to secure generative models. Code and model weights can be found at https://github.com/Mystic-Slice/Sealing-The-Backdoor .

Code production is now a commodity; the bottleneck is knowing what to build and proving it works. We present the Kitchen Loop, a framework for autonomous, self-evolving software built on a unified trust model: (1) a specification surface enumerating what the product claims to support; (2) 'As a User x 1000', where an LLM agent exercises that surface as a synthetic power user at 1,000x human cadence; (3) Unbeatable Tests, ground-truth verification the code author cannot fake; and (4) Drift Control, continuous quality measurement with automated pause gates. We validate across two production systems over 285+ iterations, producing 1,094+ merged pull requests with zero regressions detected by the regression oracle (methodology in Section 6.1). We observe emergent properties at scale: multi-iteration self-correction chains, autonomous infrastructure healing, and monotonically improving quality gates. The primitives are not new; our contribution is their composition into a production-tested system with the operational discipline that makes long-running autonomous evolution safe.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently produce false refusals, declining benign requests that contain terms resembling unsafe queries. We address this challenge by introducing two comprehensive benchmarks: the Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (XSB) for single-turn prompts, annotated with "Focus" keywords that identify refusal-inducing triggers, and the Multi-turn Scenario-based Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (MS-XSB), which systematically evaluates refusal calibration in realistic, context-rich dialog settings. Our benchmarks reveal that exaggerated refusals persist across diverse recent LLMs and are especially pronounced in complex, multi-turn scenarios. To mitigate these failures, we leverage post-hoc explanation methods to identify refusal triggers and deploy three lightweight, model-agnostic approaches, ignore-word instructions, prompt rephrasing, and attention steering, at inference time, all without retraining or parameter access. Experiments on four instruction-tuned Llama models demonstrate that these strategies substantially improve compliance on safe prompts while maintaining robust safety protections. Our findings establish a reproducible framework for diagnosing and mitigating exaggerated refusals, highlighting practical pathways to safer and more helpful LLM deployments.

The releases of powerful open-weight large language models (LLMs) are often not accompanied by access to their full training data. Existing interpretability methods, particularly those based on activations, often require or assume distributionally similar data. This is a significant limitation when detecting and defending against novel potential threats like backdoors, which are by definition out-of-distribution. In this work, we introduce a new method for understanding, monitoring and controlling fine-tuned LLMs that interprets weights, rather than activations, thereby sidestepping the need for data that is distributionally similar to the unknown training data. We demonstrate that the top singular vectors of the weight difference between a fine-tuned model and its base model correspond to newly acquired behaviors. By monitoring the cosine similarity of activations along these directions, we can detect salient behaviors introduced during fine-tuning with high precision. For backdoored models that bypass safety mechanisms when a secret trigger is present, our method stops up to 100% of attacks with a false positive rate below 1%. For models that have undergone unlearning, we detect inference on erased topics with accuracy up to 95.42% and can even steer the model to recover "unlearned" information. Besides monitoring, our method also shows potential for pre-deployment model auditing: by analyzing commercial instruction-tuned models (OLMo, Llama, Qwen), we are able to uncover model-specific fine-tuning focus including mathematical problem solving, emoji usage, and Midjourney prompt generation.

This study reveals a previously unexplored vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). Existing aligned LLMs predominantly respond to unsafe queries with refusals, which often begin with a fixed set of prefixes (I'm sorry). We demonstrate that this rigid refusal pattern is a vulnerability and introduce a novel refusal unlearning technique that exploits it. Specifically, we fine-tune LLMs using merely 1,000 benign samples, where each response is prepended with a refusal prefix. The underlying intuition is to disrupt the refusal completion pathway, thereby driving the model to forget how to refuse while following harmful instructions. This intuition is further supported by theoretical proofs. We apply this approach to a total of 16 LLMs, including various open-source models from Llama, Qwen, and Gemma families, as well as closed-source models such as Gemini and GPT. Experimental results show that the safety scores of previously aligned LLMs degrade both consistently and substantially. Importantly, we verify that the observed gain cannot be attributed to plain fine-tuning or random prefix effects. Our findings suggest that current safety alignment may rely heavily on token sequence memorization rather than reasoning, motivating future work beyond simple refusal mechanisms. Code has been released: https://github.com/guoyang9/refusal-unlearning.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Effectively training Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex, long-CoT reasoning is often bottlenecked by the need for massive high-quality reasoning data. Existing methods are either computationally expensive or fail to reliably distinguish high- from low-quality reasoning samples. To address this, we propose High-Entropy Sum (HES), a training-free metric that quantifies reasoning quality by summing only the entropy of the top (e.g., 0.5\%) highest-entropy tokens in each reasoning sample. We validate HES across three mainstream training paradigms: Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT), Rejection Fine-tuning (RFT), and Reinforcement Learning (RL), with extensive results demonstrating its consistent effectiveness and significantly reduced computational overhead. In SFT, training on the top 20\% HES-ranked data matches full-dataset performance, while using the lowest-HES data degrades it. In RFT, our HES-based training approach significantly outperforms baseline methods. In RL, HES-selected successful trajectories enable the model to learn strong reasoning patterns, significantly surpassing other compared methods. Our findings establish HES as a robust, training-free metric that enables a unified, effective, and efficient method for developing advanced reasoning in LLMs.

Reinforcement learning with human-annotated data has boosted chain-of-thought reasoning in large reasoning models, but these gains come at high costs in labeled data while faltering on harder tasks. A natural next step is experience-driven learning, where models improve without curated labels by adapting to unlabeled data. We introduce RESTRAIN (REinforcement learning with Self-restraint), a self-penalizing RL framework that converts the absence of gold labels into a useful learning signal. Instead of overcommitting to spurious majority votes, RESTRAIN exploits signals from the model's entire answer distribution: penalizing overconfident rollouts and low-consistency examples while preserving promising reasoning chains. The self-penalization mechanism integrates seamlessly into policy optimization methods such as GRPO, enabling continual self-improvement without supervision. On challenging reasoning benchmarks, RESTRAIN delivers large gains using only unlabeled data. With Qwen3-4B-Base and OctoThinker Hybrid-8B-Base, it improves Pass@1 by up to +140.7 percent on AIME25, +36.2 percent on MMLU_STEM, and +19.6 percent on GPQA-Diamond, nearly matching gold-label training while using no gold labels. These results demonstrate that RESTRAIN establishes a scalable path toward stronger reasoning without gold labels.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

In mid-2026 a slogan reorganized how practitioners talk about coding agents: stop prompting your agent, start designing the loop that prompts it. We take this claim seriously and give it a careful treatment. We call the object of the new practice the loop specification: a bounded, reusable artifact, made of a trigger, a goal, a verification step, a stopping rule and a memory, that a human hands to an agent harness (such as Claude Code or Codex) so the agent pursues a goal on its own, in place of step-by-step prompting. We distinguish this external loop specification from two things it is often confused with: an ordinary programming loop, and the internal perceive-act-observe cycle that the harness already provides as plumbing. We position loop engineering as a new layer in the progression from prompt to context to harness to loop, and we argue, against the stronger headlines, that it does not retire prompt engineering; loop and prompt are distinct tools with distinct uses. We offer four contributions: a definition and scope for the discipline; an anatomy and taxonomy of loop specifications organized around trigger, goal type, a five-level verification ladder, architecture, and named terminal states; a descriptive analysis of the Loop Library, a public corpus of fifty real loops that we code by hand; and a set of design principles and anti-patterns grounded in the scientific literature on self-correction, reward hacking and model-as-judge fragility. The corpus shows that practice has matured most where the discipline says it matters: seventy percent of loops verify in the autonomous zone of the ladder and seventy-four percent name their terminal states, while automated triggering and durable memory remain comparatively underdeveloped. We close with the limits the practice must respect, including the verification burden, comprehension debt and the risk of cognitive surrender.

Tabular machine learning presents a paradox: modern models achieve state-of-the-art performance using high-dimensional (high-D), collinear, error-prone data, defying the "Garbage In, Garbage Out" mantra. To help resolve this, we synthesize principles from Information Theory, Latent Factor Models, and Psychometrics, clarifying that predictive robustness arises not solely from data cleanliness, but from the synergy between data architecture and model capacity. Partitioning predictor-space "noise" into "Predictor Error" and "Structural Uncertainty" (informational deficits from stochastic generative mappings), we prove that leveraging high-D sets of error-prone predictors asymptotically overcomes both types of noise, whereas cleaning a low-D set is fundamentally bounded by Structural Uncertainty. We demonstrate why "Informative Collinearity" (dependencies from shared latent causes) enhances reliability and convergence efficiency, and explain why increased dimensionality reduces the latent inference burden, enabling feasibility with finite samples. To address practical constraints, we propose "Proactive Data-Centric AI" to identify predictors that enable robustness efficiently. We also derive boundaries for Systematic Error Regimes and show why models that absorb "rogue" dependencies can mitigate assumption violations. Linking latent architecture to Benign Overfitting, we offer a first step towards a unified view of robustness to Outcome Error and predictor-space noise, while also delineating when traditional DCAI's focus on label cleaning remains powerful. By redefining data quality from item-level perfection to portfolio-level architecture, we provide a theoretical rationale for "Local Factories" -- learning from live, uncurated enterprise "data swamps" -- supporting a deployment paradigm shift from "Model Transfer" to "Methodology Transfer'' to overcome static generalizability limitations.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Alignment tuning is meant to make harmful-request refusal robust, yet this safety behavior can be erased by a small set of benign fine-tuning examples. This is a deployment risk for open-weight models because a checkpoint can pass refusal tests at release time and later lose refusal under low-cost downstream fine-tuning. Prior work has established these refusal failures, but existing studies do not show how to detect this fragility in the aligned model itself before an attack or fine-tuning intervention is run. We introduce Skin-Deep, a geometric diagnostic that detects alignment fragility directly from the aligned model's hidden-state activations before such an intervention is run and compresses the layer-wise safety geometry into a single scalar, the Geometric Fragility Score (GFS). Applied to twenty-one instruction-tuned models spanning six alignment recipes and 3B--32B parameters, Skin-Deep reveals a recurring low-rank safety subspace across model families. Direction ablations show that removing directions in this subspace weakens harmful-request refusal, providing causal evidence that the recovered geometry underlies refusal behavior. Crucially, GFS identifies, before any fine-tuning, the initially safe model that retains the most refusal after small-scale LoRA fine-tuning. These results establish GFS as a practical pre-deployment diagnostic for flagging fragile refusal behavior without running an attack.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities across domains, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor strategies predominantly operate at the token level, where an injected trigger causes the model to generate a specific target word, choice, or class (depending on the task). Recent advances, however, exploit the long-form reasoning tendencies of modern LLMs to conduct reasoning-level backdoors: once triggered, the victim model inserts one or more malicious reasoning steps into its chain-of-thought (CoT). These attacks are substantially harder to detect, as the backdoored answer remains plausible and consistent with the poisoned reasoning trajectory. Yet, defenses tailored to this type of backdoor remain largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose Critical-CoT, a novel defense mechanism that conducts a two-stage fine-tuning (FT) process on LLMs to develop critical thinking behaviors, enabling them to automatically identify potential backdoors and refuse to generate malicious reasoning steps. Extensive experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets demonstrate that Critical-CoT provides strong robustness against both in-context learning-based and FT-based backdoor attacks. Notably, Critical-CoT exhibits strong cross-domain and cross-task generalization. Our code is available at hthttps://github.com/tuanvu171/Critical-CoT.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is commonly used to train language models to imitate annotated responses for given instructions. In this paper, we challenge this paradigm and propose Critique Fine-Tuning (CFT), a strategy where models learn to critique noisy responses rather than simply imitate correct ones. Inspired by human learning processes that emphasize critical thinking, CFT encourages deeper analysis and nuanced understanding-traits often overlooked by standard SFT. To validate the effectiveness of CFT, we construct a 50K-sample dataset from WebInstruct, using GPT-4o as the teacher to generate critiques in the form of (input=[query; noisy response], output=critique). CFT on this dataset yields a consistent 4-10% improvement over SFT on six math benchmarks with different base models like Qwen2.5, Qwen2.5-Math and DeepSeek-Math. We further expand to MetaMath and NuminaMath datasets and observe similar gains over SFT. Notably, our Qwen2.5-Math-CFT model-trained on just 50K samples-matches or outperforms competitive models such as AceMath and Qwen2.5-Math-Instruct on most benchmarks, both of which use over 2M samples. Ablation studies show that CFT is robust to the source of noisy response and teacher critique model. Through these findings, we argue that critique-based training offers a more effective alternative to advance the reasoning of language models.

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has marked significant achievements in language processing and reasoning capabilities. Despite their advancements, LLMs face vulnerabilities to data poisoning attacks, where the adversary inserts backdoor triggers into training data to manipulate outputs. This work further identifies additional security risks in LLMs by designing a new data poisoning attack tailored to exploit the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) process. We propose a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning (GBTL) algorithm to identify adversarial triggers efficiently, ensuring an evasion of detection by conventional defenses while maintaining content integrity. Through experimental validation across various language model tasks, including sentiment analysis, domain generation, and question answering, our poisoning strategy demonstrates a high success rate in compromising various LLMs' outputs. We further propose two defense strategies against data poisoning attacks, including in-context learning (ICL) and continuous learning (CL), which effectively rectify the behavior of LLMs and significantly reduce the decline in performance. Our work highlights the significant security risks present during SFT of LLMs and the necessity of safeguarding LLMs against data poisoning attacks.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety has often been evaluated at the behavior level, which provides limited evidence of internal robustness, as these evaluations target outputs rather than representation-level vulnerability under intervention. We formalize this discrepancy as the audit gap: the difference between behavioral safety and robustness under intervention. To study this gap, we construct dissociated models that preserve safe outward behavior while remaining vulnerable in the latent space. We introduce an intervention-based evaluation framework to test model robustness through soft interventions in parameter and latent spaces, including harmful fine-tuning and layer-wise latent perturbations. To formalize the evaluation, we propose the Latent Vulnerability Score (LVS) to measure how easily harmful behavior can be elicited by bounded latent perturbations. Using this evaluation framework, we show that behavioral safety metrics are insufficient measures of representation-level robustness across multiple safely and unsafely aligned state-of-the-art models. Notably, dissociated models show substantially elevated LVSs despite comparable refusal behavior under harmful intervention, with intermediate representations being the most sensitive to intervention. Our results suggest that behavioral safety evaluation alone provides an incomplete picture of model robustness, motivating representation-aware audits of latent vulnerability and observable behavior.

In the context of the rising interest in code language models (code LMs) and vulnerability detection, we study the effectiveness of code LMs for detecting vulnerabilities. Our analysis reveals significant shortcomings in existing vulnerability datasets, including poor data quality, low label accuracy, and high duplication rates, leading to unreliable model performance in realistic vulnerability detection scenarios. Additionally, the evaluation methods used with these datasets are not representative of real-world vulnerability detection. To address these challenges, we introduce PrimeVul, a new dataset for training and evaluating code LMs for vulnerability detection. PrimeVul incorporates a novel set of data labeling techniques that achieve comparable label accuracy to human-verified benchmarks while significantly expanding the dataset. It also implements a rigorous data de-duplication and chronological data splitting strategy to mitigate data leakage issues, alongside introducing more realistic evaluation metrics and settings. This comprehensive approach aims to provide a more accurate assessment of code LMs' performance in real-world conditions. Evaluating code LMs on PrimeVul reveals that existing benchmarks significantly overestimate the performance of these models. For instance, a state-of-the-art 7B model scored 68.26% F1 on BigVul but only 3.09% F1 on PrimeVul. Attempts to improve performance through advanced training techniques and larger models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 were unsuccessful, with results akin to random guessing in the most stringent settings. These findings underscore the considerable gap between current capabilities and the practical requirements for deploying code LMs in security roles, highlighting the need for more innovative research in this domain.

We study auto research as a closed empirical loop driven by external measurement. Each submitted trial carries a hypothesis, an executable code edit, an evaluator-owned outcome, and feedback that shapes the next proposal. The output is not a generated paper or a single model checkpoint, but an auditable trajectory of proposals, code diffs, experiments, scores, and failure labels. We instantiate this loop with specialist agents that partition recipe surfaces and share measured lineage across trials. The central empirical finding is that lineage feedback lets agents turn evaluator outcomes, including crashes, budget overruns, size failures, and accuracy-gate misses, into later program-level recipe edits rather than one-shot suggestions. Across 1,197 headline-run trials plus 600 Parameter Golf control trials after one-time setup and launch, humans did not choose proposals, edit recipes, override scores, or repair failed trials during the search. In the three headline runs, the same submitted-trial loop reduces Parameter Golf validation bpb by 0.81%, raises NanoChat-D12 CORE by 38.7%, and reduces CIFAR-10 Airbench96 wallclock by 4.59%, with each task measured by its own external evaluator and legality checks. The trace includes a strict architecture-domain audit of 157 headline-run submissions and program rewrites such as a NanoChat attention-kernel path change. Within this scope the loop autonomously writes code, submits experiments, absorbs feedback, applies and combines known techniques inside each environment, and improves public starting recipes.

Proactive agents must decide not only what to say but also whether and when to intervene. Many current systems rely on brittle heuristics or indiscriminate long reasoning, which offers little control over the benefit-burden tradeoff. We formulate the problem as cost-sensitive selective intervention and present PRISM, a novel framework that couples a decision-theoretic gate with a dual-process reasoning architecture. At inference time, the agent intervenes only when a calibrated probability of user acceptance exceeds a threshold derived from asymmetric costs of missed help and false alarms. Inspired by festina lente (Latin: "make haste slowly"), we gate by an acceptance-calibrated, cost-derived threshold and invoke a resource-intensive Slow mode with counterfactual checks only near the decision boundary, concentrating computation on ambiguous and high-stakes cases. Training uses gate-aligned, schema-locked distillation: a teacher running the full PRISM pipeline provides dense, executable supervision on unlabeled interaction traces, while the student learns a response policy that is explicitly decoupled from the intervention gate to enable tunable and auditable control. On ProactiveBench, PRISM reduces false alarms by 22.78% and improves F1 by 20.14% over strong baselines. These results show that principled decision-theoretic gating, paired with selective slow reasoning and aligned distillation, yields proactive agents that are precise, computationally efficient, and controllable. To facilitate reproducibility, we release our code, models, and resources at https://prism-festinalente.github.io/; all experiments use the open-source ProactiveBench benchmark.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious security threat for training neural networks as they surreptitiously introduce hidden functionalities into a model. Such backdoors remain silent during inference on clean inputs, evading detection due to inconspicuous behavior. However, once a specific trigger pattern appears in the input data, the backdoor activates, causing the model to execute its concealed function. Detecting such poisoned samples within vast datasets is virtually impossible through manual inspection. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach that enables model training on potentially poisoned datasets by utilizing the power of recent diffusion models. Specifically, we create synthetic variations of all training samples, leveraging the inherent resilience of diffusion models to potential trigger patterns in the data. By combining this generative approach with knowledge distillation, we produce student models that maintain their general performance on the task while exhibiting robust resistance to backdoor triggers.

This paper addresses the critical challenge of deriving interpretable confidence scores from generative language models (LLMs) when applied to multi-label content safety classification. While models like LLaMA Guard are effective for identifying unsafe content and its categories, their generative architecture inherently lacks direct class-level probabilities, which hinders model confidence assessment and performance interpretation. This limitation complicates the setting of dynamic thresholds for content moderation and impedes fine-grained error analysis. This research proposes and evaluates three novel token-level probability estimation approaches to bridge this gap. The aim is to enhance model interpretability and accuracy, and evaluate the generalizability of this framework across different instruction-tuned models. Through extensive experimentation on a synthetically generated, rigorously annotated dataset, it is demonstrated that leveraging token logits significantly improves the interpretability and reliability of generative classifiers, enabling more nuanced content safety moderation.

Current LLM safety research predominantly focuses on mitigating Goal Hijacking, preventing attackers from redirecting a model's high-level objective (e.g., from "summarizing emails" to "phishing users"). In this paper, we argue that this perspective is incomplete and highlight a critical vulnerability in Reasoning Alignment. We propose a new adversarial paradigm: Reasoning Hijacking and instantiate it with Criteria Attack, which subverts model judgments by injecting spurious decision criteria without altering the high-level task goal. Unlike Goal Hijacking, which attempts to override the system prompt, Reasoning Hijacking accepts the high-level goal but manipulates the model's decision-making logic by injecting spurious reasoning shortcut. Though extensive experiments on three different tasks (toxic comment, negative review, and spam detection), we demonstrate that even newest models are prone to prioritize injected heuristic shortcuts over rigorous semantic analysis. The results are consistent over different backbones. Crucially, because the model's "intent" remains aligned with the user's instructions, these attacks can bypass defenses designed to detect goal deviation (e.g., SecAlign, StruQ), exposing a fundamental blind spot in the current safety landscape. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Yuan-Hou/criteria_attack

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation